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Abstract 
The new infonnation economy acts as a microcosm where the dynamics of complexity are 
present through the pervasive effects of increasing returns. Network externalities are the 
ubiquitous force behind wimler-takes-all scenarios where only the strongest finns survive. The 
effect is evident in cases such as Microsoft's quasi-monopoly and eBay's dominance of the 
consumer and small business auctions market. Interestingly however, many important industries 
exhibiting strong network externalities, have emerged with no dominant wiMer and the 
competitive enviromnent is preserved. 
This empirical study of the UK mobile telecom industry, which tracks an 18-year history of 
the mobile network operators as well as the strategies and product diffusion patterns of the 
networks, found finns counteracting wiMer-takes-all forces. 
Results indicate the presence of complex adaptive behavior between competing finns. 
Strategies are reconfigured to ensure the collective survival of all operators in the industry. The 
probability that one finn will dominate and that the rest will fail is eliminated. A complex set of 
isomorphic strategies emerges at the levels of network platfonns, technical standards and 
consumer platfonns. Through strategic herding, network externalities are exploited to act for the 
benefit of the whole industry causing competitors' market shares to converge dramatically to 
equal levels. 
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1. Introduction 
The new infonnation economy acts as a microcosm where the dynamics of complexity are 
manifest through the pervasive presence of increasing returns. Network adoption patterns for 
network products, such as computer operating systems, the internet, software packages and 
mobile telephones, show strong increasing returns characteristics. The rate of increase in demand 
exhibits a gradual rate of initial adoption, followed by an exponential increase in demand once a 
critical mass of users is reached. 
In complexity theory, increasing returns such as network externalities are a fonn of positive 
feedback reflected in our linguistic expressions such as 'the rich grow richer' and 'success breeds 
success.' The implication of this concept is that companies with network platfonns that are being 
adopted rapidly will gain even more momentum to diffuse further into the population. 
Consequently, it becomes almost impossible for other companies to thrive in the market. This 
'wiMer-takes-all' scenario is evident in Microsoft's quasi-monopoly and eBay's dominance of 
the consumer and small business auctions market. 
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However, whilst increasing returns predict that network markets should tip in favor of a 
dominant player, we observe important network industries, such as telecommunications, where 
the winner-takes-all scenario does not occur and the competitive environment is preserved. The 
industry players are not seen to exploit the monopolistic consequences of network externalities. 
The complex characteristics of network externalities are exploited for the benefit of all the 
firms in the industry. The mobile communications industry provides a fascinating case of 
dynamics where interacting forces operate to retain a threshold of power over the outcome of the 
networks. Interdependence in network industries is a scenario that is unique in terms of theory, 
but one which is prevalent in the new infonnation economy. 
The emerging science of complexity may provide new perspectives in strategy that combine 
concepts that are under investigated by research in the field (Stacey, 1995). The relevance of 
complexity to network industry strategy lies in the presence of positive feedback, non-linearity 
and increasing returns characterized by network externalities. 
In the following sections we look at the non-linear dynamics of networks and discuss aspects 
of complexity latent in the structure of telecommunication platforms. 
2. The Power of Network Externalities 
Network externalities! are pervasive in the new information economy. They are typical of 
infonnation-based products that are stored, recalled, copied, filtered, seen, transmitted and 
received (Shapiro, Varian, 1999). Infonnation products become more attractive, more developed 
and more useful as they become widely adopted by consumers. 
This mechanism exhibits a fonn of increasing retums captured in the work of Arthur (1989) 
and Metcalfe (1994). Arthur applies network externalities to discuss technology adoption of fax 
machines, video recorders, operating systems, computer hardware for telecommunications and 
internet-based tecimologies. Metcalfe's Law states that, under certain conditions, the utility of a 
network increases with the square of the number ofusers.2 
Liebowitz and Margolis (1995) view network externalities as the increase in the net value of 
an action that occurs as the number of agents taking equivalent actions increases. Katz and 
Shapiro (1985) define network externalities as the increasing utility that a user derives from 
consumption of a product as the number of other users who consume the same product increases. 
Network externalities work similarly in language adoption. The number of people speaking a 
language across different borders is likely to affect which language will be adopted 
internationally. A decision to adopt a second language is subject to the expected size of the 
network of speakers. The adoption of the language locks into a positive feedback spiral that 
increases as the language is adopted by more users. 
Indirect network externalities are created by the presence of complementary goods, 
particularly in the software industry. Indirect network externalities occur when the value of a 
product is amplified as the number of the complementary goods or services increases. In the 
computer industry, indirect network externalities are referred to as the 'hardware-software 
paradigm'. The success of an operating system for personal computers depends on the variety of 
1 Nework externalities are also referred to as network effects. 
2 The total utility CU) of a network is equal to NCN-l) where N is the number of people on a network. The values of 
NCN-l) and N2 become more equal for increasing values ofN. Hence Metcalfe's expression "square the people" as 
a measure of gauging network utility. 
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software applications available in the market. The value given to the product may depend more 
critically on software applications. 
Mobile communications networks experience positive feedback on both the demand and 
supply sides (McGee, Thomas, Wilson, 2005). On the demand side, the value of a system 
increases with the increase of its usage, and hence the demand for the product increases. The 
positive feedback generated by the demand side originates from the entire telecommunications 
network and not just the networks of the individual companies. The value of a mobile platform is 
that it is linked to competing mobile and landline networks. On the supply-side, the larger a 
mobile network becomes in tenns of its subscriber base, the more flexible it is to lower its tariffs. 
Its investment costs in infrastructure would be covered faster than that of smaller networks. The 
lower the tariffs introduced by a network, the more new subscribers will join the network and 
positive feedback kicks in. 
What fuels the success of mobile communications is the combination of positive feedback 
from both demand side and supply-side economics. The result is a double effect in which growth 
on the demand side reduces cost on the supply side and makes the product more attractive to 
other users, accelerating the growth in demand even further. The sitnation creates a new set of 
dynamics for our traditional industrial economy. New types of economies of scale are emerging 
and winner takes all strategies have become prevalent (McGee, Sammut-Bonnici, 2002). 
2.1 Network Externalities and Market Tipping 
Market tipping is a result of the bandwagon effect of consumer demand spurred by network 
externalities. The first companies to set up their businesses in an information-based market have 
an advantage over later competitors (Mahajan, Peterson, 1985). Product adoption gains 
momentnm at an increasing rate as more consumers join the platform. The more established 
markets will benefit from increasing retnrns to scale and from positive feedback on the demand 
side. The effect strengthens initial achievements and triggers the early defeat of new entrants 
(Arthur, 1996). Competing technology may lose ground as the more established technologies 
continue to grow in strength. A market that moves in favor of a particular product or standard is 
said to have 'tipped'. 
After the tipping point a market could be locked into that product for some time. This is called 
excess inertia that could persist even when a technologically more advanced standard is put on 
the market (Katz, Shapiro, 1985; Farrell, Saloner, 1986a). Lock-in effects exist when it is costly 
to switch from one competing standard to another. There is an inveshnent in skill and 
competence when switching from Windows to Linux. When an airline switches from flying 
Boeing to Airbus aircraft it must invest in re-training its crews and engineers, often making 
existing knowledge redundant. Network theory predicts that network systems will become larger 
in order to achieve stronger retnrns to scale. 
The rapid progression of market tipping is linked to critical mass. At the critical mass point 
the utility of the network increases rapidly, and it becomes considerably easier to gain new 
subscribers. Shy (2000) describes critical mass, as the point at which a network has the minimal 
number of users needed to induce all potential consumers to adopt the technology. At the critical 
mass point the profile of the network user shifts from early adopters to a wider market base. The 
concept of critical mass is derived from physics, where it is used to describe nuclear fission. 
Schelling's (1978) description of collective behavior, does not address market activities, but it 
has inspired research in the diffusion of innovation. 
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Market tipping and market share dominance are expressed through the models developed by 
Arthur (1989), Redmond (1991), Clark and Chatterjee (1999). Arthur explains how markets tip 
in a simple two-product model. The model consists of two types of products. The products are 
substitutes, which implies that consumers will choose only one of the products. In Arthur's 
model consumer utility for a product is governed by intrinsic utility and network utility. 
U A = A + r NA , UB = B + r NB 
U A and UB are the total utilities of products A and B respectively. The constants A and B 
reflect the intrinsic utility of the products. NA and NB are the number of adopters of products A 
and B. The importance given to network adoption is denoted by 'r'. Consumers will choose A if 
U A > UB• A quick calculation with dU1mny variables will show that for value of r > 0, the 
equation would always lead to lock-in as N grows large for one of the two products. 
Clark and ChatteJjee (1999) build on the modeling approach of Arthur (1989) and Redmond 
(1991) to include variation in the strength of network externalities and their effect on market 
shares. Dominant market shares can arise from network effects. The level of probability of this 
occurring depends on the characteristics of the consumer decision-making process in the market. 
However, Arthur, Redmond, Clark and ChatteJjee's models do not explain how some markets 
fail to tip even in the presence of strong network externalities. 
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Figure I: Market Shares in the UK Mobile COlmnunication Industry 
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2.2 The Absence of Marketing Tipping in Mobile Telecommunications 
In spite of the monopolistic consequences of network externalities, several network industries 
fail to tip preserving the competitive environment. The UK mobile communication market did 
not move towards a dominant player. By the end of 2003 the UK market shares in tenns of 
network users converged to 24%,24%,25% and 27% for Vodafone, 02,3 T-Mobile4 and Orange 
respectively (Figure I). The company with the largest market share was the last to enter the 
market. The four companies represent the full population of mobile network operators servicing 
over 50 million subscribers (Figure 2). 
In view of the existing knowledge on network externalities, we develop our research question 
regarding the nature of consumer adoption of competing interconnected networks: How is the 
competitive environment preserved in network industries despite the monopolistic consequences 
of network externalities? 
Whilst the theory of network externalities points us towards an interesting journey to unravel 
increasing returns dynamics, it does not pose questions on what may be the cause of the 
preservation of the competitive environment. There is a need for a more critical conceptual 
approach to study market development that captures the complexity of the development 
processes (Sammut-Bonnici, Wensley, 2002). 
We look at complexity theory to introduce the dynamic perspective in this research. 
Complexity endorses the underlying mechanism of non-linearity in network externalities, whilst 
recognizing the presence of self-organizing mechanisms. Complexity sheds light on the 
processes of co-operation, adaptation and outcomes as factors that create change and 
transfonnation. We investigate patterns of adaptive behavior which dampen the monopolistic 
consequences of network externalities. 
3 02's previous brand name was Cellnet. 
4 T-Mobile's previous brand name was One 2 One. 
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Figure 2: UK Mobile Market Development over 18 years 
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Telecommunications networks reflect the original Greek roots of the word 'complexity', 
which means 'entwined together as in a piece of woven cloth' (Battram, 1999) . Physical 
platforms in mobile communications are the technical networks connecting mobile phones, base 
stations, mobile exchanges and landline exchanges. The system extends from local, to national 
and to an international level (Figure 3). In mobile network the end nodes representing the users 
would be 'fuzzy' because of the movement of the end user. 
Linguistically, complexity is equivalent to 'complicatedness': a system with several nodes 
and interconnections. Systems are complex not just because of its different components but 
because of its interconnectedness. The complexity within mobile telephone networks lies in the 
ability of each free moving end node to connect to any other node via a plethora of connecting 
exchanges, across multiple layers of technical platforms and compatible standards. 
3.1 Complexity and Network Interconnectivity 
Telecommunications platforms have had to cope with the complexity of interoperability 
among different systems, and to master the agility required to shift rapidly to newer standards. 
Interoperability exists between platfonns of different mobile network operators in the same 
country, or different platfonns in different countries. Physical platforms have evolved from the 
simple structures such as the older regional railway systems, to a complex structure of 
interconnected sub-platfonns. 
Complex networks such as telecommunications are the subjects of a new field of research that 
applies graph theory (Buchanan, 2002). Networks are mapped as graphs that are composed of a 
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collection of dots and connecting lines. The dots are associated with the elements of the system. 
The lines correspond to the interactions or connections between pairs of elements. A similar 
approach is adopted in network economics (Economides, 1996; Gottinger, 2003). 
Figure 3: Telecommunications Networks - Nodes and Interconnections 
TelecOlmnunications networks fall under an 'integrative class' of complex networks, because 
of their tendency to integrate infonnation from a large number of sources. Other networks that 
fonn part of this class are air traffic control and management systems, military cOlmnand and 
control systems and electricity network sharing. The integrative class is characterized by: a large 
number of diverse infonnation sources; the need to interoperate and integrate both equipment 
and infonnation; the need to detect events in a complex network of connections; the need to 
operate across techno-socio barriers; and the need to operate as an open system which includes 
interoperability, portability, scalability and the need to evolve. 
The aspect of interconnectivity in the mobile communications industry creates a more 
homogenous market enviromnent: network services from any finn provide largely the same 
function. 
Interestingly models of market development of interconnected products are a very recent 
addition to the literature on network industries, even though most reT products run on 
interconnected platfonns. By adding converter technology to achieve compatibility, Gottinger 
(2003) produces interesting changes to Arthur's model (1989) discussed earlier. Parameters k 
and c are introduced assuming values from 0 to 1, which represent the compatibility of platfonn 
A and B and the reciprocal compatibility of B and A, respectively. The value of 1 represents 
perfect compatibility and 0 reflects total incompatibility. Gottinger's fonnula can be collapsed to 
Arthur's fonnula when k=c=O. 
UA =A + rNA +kNB, UB =B +rNB + cNA 
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According to this model the introduction of a partial two-way converter will prolong the time 
required for a market to tip in favor of one network or the other. The introduction of a perfect 
two-way converter where k=1 will prevent any technology from emerging as the standard. The 
value I leads network externalities to be effectively eliminated from the situation as independent 
forces on the respective network. The elimination of network externalities from Gottinger's 
fonnula throws light on the conundrum of market share convergence in the UIC mobile phone 
industry, but it does not reflect the real mobile communications environment. Network 
externalities remain strong and real as the adoption by consumers will fuel further adoption. 
What the fonnula suggests is that in the U1( mobile communications industry network 
externalities act equally on the competing finns based on the number of users on the whole 
industry's network platfonn. 
In view of the concepts of network connectivity, the research question regarding the 
preservation of competition, which we framed earlier is reflected in the following hypothesis: 
HYP01BESIS I: Network externalities derived from the platform of the whole industly, are 
expected to be similar to those derived Fom a single constituent network. 
The scenario reflected in the hypothesis implies that the decision of a new user to connect to a 
mobile platfonn is influenced by the number of users on the whole industry'S platfonn, rather 
than the number of users on the individual finn's platfonn. 
3.2 Complex Adaptive Systems 
The mobile communications network acts as a complex adaptive system. It comprises several 
interacting agents and components. The behavior of each agent is generally definable. However, 
the behavior of the system is emergent and shows signs of intelligence in the way it learns, reacts 
and adapts to changes in the larger network. For example, technological capability is in constant 
evolution. Different parts of the conununications system around the globe are updated with these 
teclmologies. Over the years the telecommunications industry has acquired collective knowledge 
of how to introduce new technologies whilst retaining the compatibility of its sub networks. 
Other fonns of adaptive behavior appear in the continuous development, selection and 
coordination of cOImnunication protocols. Similar complex adaptive systems are everywhere in 
the economy and in the natural environment in the fonn of stock markets, consumer markets, 
social groups, cities, the brain, swanns, and rainforest systems, among many others. (Gell-Mann, 
1995) 
A complex adaptive system starts with simple rules and goals for the individual, which create 
an organized complex fonnation. The result is a configuration that seems to have its own life, 
which is capable of moving in hannony without a leader or external control. The process is 
bottom up starting with a few simple rules for individuals, which create a complex system. A 
random variation process of generating rules and tendencies usually activates self-organization. 
The process creates an organized fonnation referred to by von Foerster (1962) as the 'order from 
noise' principle and the 'order through fluctuations' mechanism by Prigogine and Stengers 
(1984). Self-organization requires continuous adaptation and the presence of a powerful 
interrelationship between entities in a system. Capra (1983, p. 516) asserts: 'Detailed studies of 
ecosystems over the past decades have shown quite clearly that most relationships between 
living organisms are essentially co-operative ones, characterized by co-existence and 
interdependence. ' 
At the level of technological standards and physical platfonns, adaptive behavior arises from 
competition and co-operation among the system agents. In this environment competition 
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becomes the driving force behind co-operation. Competing firms are observed to spontaneously 
forge alliances and symbiotic relationships in order to increase the industry further. The larger 
the industry, the more space for all players, and the higher the probability that more companies 
would survive and flourish. Competition and co-operation are closely interrelated: alliances 
emerge at every level and in every kind of complex adaptive system, from biology to economics 
to politics (Axelrod, 1997). 
Moore (1996) urges businesses to adopt a co-operative ecosystem model. He describes how 
Intel developed a co-evolving network of businesses to become a major supplier of microchips. 
The feedback loop in co-evolution is towards more complexity. There is also the possibility of a 
decline in diversity, as we will see in the case of the mobile communications industry. When 
enviromnents are competitive and aggressive from the start up phase, co-operation emerges 
between the parties for the benefit of all. 
Cohen and Stewart (1994) explain the process through the concept of 'simplexity' and 
'complicity'. 'Simplexity' is the tendency of a single, simple system to generate highly complex 
behavior. This leads to 'complicity', which is when two or more systems interact in a mntual 
feedback that changes them both, leading to behavior that is not present in either system on its 
own. This is also a characteristic of emergence through co-evolution, which is the 
interdependence between a system, or an organization and its enviromnent. Lewin et al (1999) 
look at strategic and organization adaptations as co-evolving with fluctuations in the 
environment, population and organizational forms. Examples of such fluctuations would be 
competitive dynamics, technological and institutional changes. 
Our next hypothesis is developed in view of the theory of complexity, which encompasses 
both dynamics of interacting agents, system rules, and co-operation in the form of complicity. 
HYPOTHESIS 2: Market shares of interconnected networks converge as a result of complex 
adaptive behavior of competing firms, whereby the industry is configured for the collective 
benefit of the constituent firms. 
4. Methods 
The above hypotheses represent two models. The first hypothesis pertains to the relationship 
between complex increasing return dynamics (in the fonn of network externalities) and the 
platfonn performance of the respective firms. The second hypothesis pertains to the relationship 
between complex adaptive behavior and platform performance. Performance is defined in terms 
of the number of users who adopt the network platfonn, in accordance to network diffusion and 
network economics theory. 
The basis of network economics provides a sound point of departure for our research on 
network externalities. It leads the investigation into the nature and extent of the power of 
network effects and exponential mechanisms of demand. Whilst the theory of network 
economics points us towards an interesting journey to unravel network externality dynamics, it 
does not pose questions on how the competitive enviromnent is preserved. As a positive theory, 
network economics does not encompass other modes of change. We look at complexity theory to 
introduce a dynamic perspective in this research. 
In revealing patterns of complex behavior within an industry, a dynamic vocabulary must be 
adopted. By bringing in the langnage of complexity we gain a broader terminology. The choice 
of terms in previous work on industry evolution (Nelson, Winter, 1982) implies that some 
absolute level of a particular mode of evolution can be measured or graded in a positivist 
manner. This is similar to Rumelt's (1974) concept that the langnage in research on strategy 
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content implies that strategy can be measured or graded in a positivist manner. Complexity 
evolutionary theory has a more dynamic view of the development of systems. It acknowledges 
both self-reinforcing increasing returns and self-balancing mechanisms as agents of change and 
development. 
4.1 Sample selection: 
The UK mobile conununications industry was chosen as the site for the investigation of 
market development in the presence of network externalities. The UK was selected as an 
industry base because it is the country which shows the strongest preservation of the competitive 
environment in the mobile conununications industry in the European region. The companies 
were chosen to maximize on the organizational dimensions of endogenous and exogenous factors 
that the companies had faced during the founding period. The selection of the complete 
population of finns is critical to eliminate alternative accounts of patterns in corporate 
emergence. The companies under review: Vodafone, 02, T-Mobile and Orange, constitute all the 
network providers in the mobile telephone industry for the country. The study covers the history 
of the UK mobile communications industry from its inception date in 1985 to 2002. 
4.2 Data Collection 
"History is the version of past events that people have decided to agree upon." This quotation 
by Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821) represents the key difficulties in collecting historical 
infonnation. The issues of interpretation and recollection of past events was a major concern 
when designing the research process. In order to build a comprehensive history of strategies and 
outcomes the data source had to be free from these challenges. We looked at historical research 
methodologies in order to construct a robust set of data that is not modified by the lag between 
the time of occurrence of the event and the time of collection. The infonnation source had to 
consist of infonnation that was compiled in real time as the events were occurring. The source of 
infonnation we selected was the Lexis Nexis online database. The electronic catalogue offered 
the facility to look for industry specific cOlnmentaries from major journals and newspapers from 
the UK and internationally. Data was mined using standard search conditions which controlled 
the period under review and the frequency of incidence of the company names. 
We obtained both quantitative and qualitative infonnation in order to construct a longitudinal 
history of the strategic events initiated by the industry players. The time series for the four 
companies were compared. The industry's historical date was channeled into two key databases: 
the Subscriber Database and the Events Database. 
The Subscriber Database contained infonnation on network diffusion, and how the consumer 
market adopted the mobile communications networks. The investigation of network externalities 
required quantitative data on the demand function of the industry. For this purpose we 
constructed a subscriber database containing numeric infonnation on the acquisition of new 
customers by the mobile network companies on a monthly basis. The database helped us build a 
clearer picture of patterns in the development of the industry's demand. The database consists of 
over 200 records with 2,420 data elements with fields for units of time, industry network size, 
and finns network size on a monthly and on a cumulative basis. 
The second database, the Events Database, provided detailed infonnation on the nature and 
timing of the marketing activities of the companies in our sample. The database took the fonn of 
a case study archive, which catalogued all the events happening in the industry over eighteen 
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years. The database supported a detail case history of some 3,000 events, which were identifiable 
through the date of occurrence and coded by type of activity. The database provided a solid basis 
for data mining and supported several analytical configurations. Elements of the industry's 
history were rapidly searchable. Through the codification of longitudinal data we were able to 
build a history of the mobile cOlmnunications industry based on multiple levels of temporality 
and the role of the various players in the industry. 
The methodology we applied improved on the traditional case study methodology of building 
a fixed case history and then proceeding with extracting inferences from it. We have developed a 
case study in the form of an events database, which catalogues all the events in the industry's life 
cycle from inception to the present date. This innovative approach to developing comprehensive 
case studies has significant advantages over the traditional method. Firstly, the case study 
database supports a more detailed case history that is not limited by the context of a condensed 
case study, as found in most research projects. Secondly, since the case history is retained in its 
complex state, we reduce the issue of researcher bias. Bias occurs because what is included or 
excluded from the case study would inevitably be influenced by the researcher's perspective of 
what is important. Thirdly, since the database is coded by event title, date, and event type it 
provides a basis for data management and enables many useful configurations of analytical 
possibilities. Elements of the case study are rapidly searchable. Fourthly, we retain the ability to 
build a traditional descriptive case study at any time from the case study database. Through this 
technique we were able to efficiently build traditional case studies on corporate ownership and 
supply chain history, based on multiple levels of temporality. The fifth advantage of the database 
is the opportunity it provides for interlinking events and time frames for a more detailed 
multilevel form of analysis. 
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4.3 Quautitative Data Analysis 
The research looked at a complex chain of events over time. Through pattern matching, we 
compared patterns with theory-based predictions and uncovered mechanism of a self-reinforcing 
and self-balancing nature. The process was completed through application of standard 
quantitative and qualitative techniques. 
A cross-correlation method of analyzing time series was applied to gauge the presence of 
network externalities by looking at the correlation between subscriber acquisition in period (t) 
and the total size of the industry networks in (t-l). The correlation function provides a measure 
of the similarity between the time series data we were analyzing. This method had a number of 
strengths. Firstly, the approach did not require the summing of data over time and hence met our 
requirement of preserving the time component of the data. Secondly, by measuring the degree of 
similarity over a continuous range of time frames it identified where the degree of similarity was 
strongest. Thirdly, the measure of similarity could be selected according to the nature of the data, 
and hence can be applied to the data sets. 
The research process necessitated the identification of critical mass, which was evaluated in 
terms of inflection points on the demand function. An inflection point occurs when the rate of 
change, or the gradient of the curve, changes in magnitude and direction. A typical diffusion of 
innovation curve has an s-shape with a first-order inflection and two second-order inflection 
points (Valente, 1995). 
Through another set of correlation analysis we searched for marketing effects by correlating 
the occurrence of marketing activities and the increase in the subscriber population. 
Dichotomous variables were applied to preserve the temporal component of the data. Data of the 
type Oil reflected the presence or absence of a particular strategic marketing action. This type of 
analysis has been used in a number of fields (Brock, Le Baron, 1996). The technique is applied 
in the natural sciences, in particular signal processing which deals with typical Oil type events. 
The research hypothesis developed from the complexity framework required us to identify 
cross industry patterns of strategy over time of the network operators. In order to achieve this we 
obtained longitudinal data to construct time series of the strategic events initiated by 02, 
Vodafone, Orange and T-Mobile. The time series for the four companies are compared. The 
accomplishment of Miller and Friesen (1984) and Meyer et al (1993) in creating rich time series 
from archival data, was used as a basis for the data collection methodology. 
In order to separate firm attributes from those of the strategies being pursued we needed to 
investigate multiple types of strategy which were relevant to the consumer decision making 
process when choosing a network. Hence marketing strategies were chosen as the relevant set of 
strategies. The marketing typology needed to be categorized using a set of standard descriptors. 
Such a typology had to be well supported by the existing conceptual framework. The key areas 
of strategic marketing: product, price, distribution, and promotion, were selected and sets of 
further subgroups were created. 
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5. Results 
5.1 Cross Correlation Time Series Analysis 
h1 order to address the first hypothesis we apply a cross correlation time series analysis on the 
increase in subscribers and the size of the existing network platform. The time frame of the 
correlation data is set to period (t) for new subscribers and period (t-I) for the number of 
subscribers on the existing network. We establish whether network externalities are present and 
measurable at the level of the whole industry. We then investigate the strength of these 
externalities by analyzing the correlation coefficients for new subscribers per network against the 
existing number of subscribers at the level of: (i) the same network; (ii) the competitors' 
networks; and (iii) the total industry network. Table 1 summarizes the correlation coefficients for 
new subscribers and network size. 
The first inference from the results is that all combinations of the matrix are positively related. 
Network externalities are deemed to be present at the level of the whole industry, exhibiting a 
correlation coefficient of 0.8 for subscriber growth and the network size ofthe industry. 
(i) The correlation coefficients show a positive relationship between the number of new 
subscribers per network and the existing number of subscribers on the same network. 02 has the 
highest correlation at 0.8 and Orange has the lowest at 0.5. Orange has moved from being the 
smallest network in 1993 to being the largest network in 2004. The shift in its position and the 
rapid growth in its subscriber base affect the value of the coefficients. To achieve such rapid 
growth it would have been gaining new subscribers over and above the effects of network utility. 
The growth rate of Orange's network was faster than the growth rate of the industryplatfonn. 
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Table 1; Correlation of New Subscribers and Network Size 
Correlation Matrix ',b,o 
Network Size in month (t-1) from Installed Base 
New Subscribers in Industry (1) 02 (2) Vodafone (3) T-Mobile (4) 
month (t) 
1, Industry 0,8 •• 0,8 •• 0,8 •• 
2,02 0.7 •• 0,8 •• 0,8 •• 
3, Vodafone 0,6 •• 0.7 •• 0,7 •• 
4, T-Mobile 0,7 •• 0.7 •• 0,7 •• 
5, Orange 0,6 •• 0,6 •• 0,6 •• 
a Number of new subscriber to network size correlations represent 648 observations. 
b N=216 for columns 1, 2 and 3, 
, N=112 for column 4 and N=104 for column 5, 
.. = P < 0,01 
0,7 .. 
0,7 •• 
0,5 •• 
0,6 •• 
0,6 .. 
Orange (5) 
0,6 
0,7 
0,5 
0,6 
0,5 
•• 
• • 
• • 
• • 
•• 
(ii) Interestingly the correlation coefficients for a company's new subscribers and the size of 
competitors' networks show positive relationships. For example Orange's coefficients are similar 
whether new subscribers are compared to the company's own platform or to that of its 
competitors; Vodafone, 02, and T-Mobile. The same results are obtained for the other mobile 
network operators. 
(iii) The correlation results for the subscriber growth of the individual networks and the 
industry network is 0.8. The correlation results of the respective firms are in the same range. 02 
and T-Mobile have a correlation of 0.7. Vodafone and Orange show a correlation coefficient of 
0.6 for the utility of the network size of the whole industry. 
The empirical results support the first hypothesis. The subscriber increase of one company is 
influenced by the size of the total industry. The increase in subscribers is interdependent with the 
utility of the whole network as well as with the utility of competing networks. The utility of other 
networks has a similar effect on new subscribers to a company's own utility. The implication in 
mathematical terms is that pervasive network externalities dampen the mechanism of positive 
feedback on the finns' separate demand functions, and prevents the market from tipping in favor 
of the larger networks. 
We can start to understand why market shares become similar in the UK mobile 
communication industry; network externalities have a positive indiscriminate effect on the 
different networks in the industry. Competing firms benefit from industry wide network 
externalities arising from the combined network size of the whole industry. 
5.2 Patterns of Adaptive Behavior 
The second hypothesis is tested through an analysis of the nature of firm activity and the effect 
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on the increase in network subscribers. The empirical analysis utilized the subscriber database 
and the events database. In 18 years of history, there is no visible leader in the UK mobile 
communications industry. Neither is there evidence of a visible strategy initiator. Analytical 
mapping of strategy types shows that the network operators were following several steams of 
activity driven by new technological opportunities and traditional marketing tactics. The findings 
uncover patterns of co-operative and adaptive behavior aimed at reducing any strategic 
advantage that arises among competing firms. 
The deduction of patterns of strategic behavior required context with regards to what was 
happening in the industry's environment. We explored industry leadership patterns in terms of 
constant market share leadership. A second search was conducted for strategy initiators, with the 
objective of uncovering firms that may not have lead the industry, but may have been a source of 
innovative strategic action. 
We searched for patterns of market leadership in tenns of network size and market share. In 
the period under analysis there is no overall industry leader in the mobile communications 
industry. 02 held the highest market share from the start of the industry up to 1986 when it 
relinquished its lead to Vodafone. 02 never regained the pole position but came close to having 
the same market share as Vodafone in 1996 and in 2001. The 02 story defeats the idea of 'first 
mover advantage', and the concept of a seed value from the innovations diffusion literature. 
Vodafone and 02 held their positions at a stable level, until the entry ofT-Mobile and Orange in 
1993 and 1994. At that point the market share of the older companies diminished as the new 
companies rapidly increased their hold on the market. Vodafone is seen to have held the longest 
lead, from 1986 to 2001, yet Orange's meteoric rise is equally significant. 
The industry shows evidence of shifting patterns of leadership. Orange's dramatic growth 
moved it to the top position as from 2001. As the last entrant to the market, and the current 
market leader, Orange provides another exception to the concept of first mover advantage. 
As the search for a visible industry leader yielded negative results, the next line of inquiry 
searched for companies that were initiating strategic actions. Although industry leadership was 
absent in terms of network size, there could still be the possibility that a particular company 
would be the source of innovative actions. The results show that there was no consistent initiator 
of strategic action in terms of type or volume of initiatives. 
The analysis looked into the relationship between performance and strategic activity as well 
as the nature of strategic behavior. The analytical process to investigate performance looked at 
consumer demand and the correlation to strategic marketing activity. We assessed the four 
typologies of activity at the level of product, price, distribution, and promotion. 
The empirical analysis finds no correlation between new subscribers and strategic marketing 
activity, in terms of occurrence and frequency. The data on marketing events was identifiable to 
precise launch dates, whilst the data on subscriber population was available at monthly intervals. 
In order to smooth out noise in the data we summed the periods in quarters and correlated the 
resulting figures. 
Whilst the frequency and volume of strategic marketing activity had no correlation to network 
growth, there were clear occurrences of highly effective strategic actions. A case in point was the 
introduction of pre-paid telephone cards and the distribution of phone and service packages 
through supermarkets and high street shops. The effect was to catapult the industry towards its 
critical mass. The industry entered a period of rapid exponential growth leading to the capture of 
80% of the total subscriber market in just three years. 
The empirical findings concerning UK mobile communications uncover patterns of 
15 
Complexity and Complicity in Mobile Telecommunications 
homogenous strategic behavior aimed at reducing unfavorable outcomes within the industry. 
Interestingly strategies were remarkably similar, both in their nature and in the time frame in 
which they were executed. Each time one of the finns attempted to implement an innovative or 
merely a different marketing tactic its competitors copied the move within a matter of weeks or 
months. Efforts towards strategic differentiation were met with a counter mechanism in order to 
reduce the risk of one competitor succeeding more than the others. Product lines, pricing 
policies, distribution strategies, and promotional activity were copied by the finns. This leads to 
very low strategic differentiation between the network operators. 
The assessment of the degree of strategic differentiation among the network operators was 
based on an assessment of their product packages characteristics. The product offering in tenns 
of physical attributes was almost identical, since all the networks were selling products created 
by the larger global equipment producers such as Nokia, Ericsson, Motorola, and Siemens. 
The cOimnercial environment in which the product offering for each company was marketed 
showed no significant differences in customer cohorts and segments, media advertising and 
critical distribution activities. Pricing strategies were also very similar, as any innovative pricing 
policy which had any bearing on the market was quickly adopted as a standard industry practice. 
New products and services were typically introduced nationwide in the UK within the same 
time period. The isomorphic policy of concurrent launches reduces the risk of technological 
adoption deviation and ensured that competitors remained within similar perfonnance levels. 
The low strategic differentiation corroborates concepts that the greater the extent to which the 
industry's trajectory is uncertain, the greater the rate of isomorphic change (DiMaggio, Powell, 
1983). This dynamic is seen in the choice of similar standards as well as the timing of the 
introduction of new strategies and teclmologies. The mobile network operators move towards 
similar marketing network interdependence, standardization of technology and the limitations 
imposed by regulation. The three factors initiate a constraining process of isomorphism that 
forced the finns in the industry to resemble each other. 
6. Discussion 
What is outstanding about the dynamics uncovered in this research is that the UK mobile 
communications industry operates very differently from a branded oligopoly. The complicity 
element in the model emerges through the tacit intent of the players to grow the market to its full 
potential: the larger the market, the larger the market shares of the competing finns. Network 
externalities become even more powerful as all members of the industry are able to benefit from 
them through network interconnectivity and isomorphic strategies. These amplify the effect of 
externalities by stepping up the level of interconnectivity in the system from the perspective of 
the consumer platfonn. 
In the research sample, the complexity of interrelationships and strategic complicity, as 
defined by Cohen and Stewart (1994) became embedded in the system as the rules of 
competition become survival through complicity in order to grow the market collectively. The 
finns could not afford to be left behind on any new strategic initiative. This initiated a close 
watch on competitive action followed by a subsequent competitive reaction. The degree of 
innovation in the strategic reaction was strongly moderated by the limitations of 
interconnectivity and regulation, as well as by fact that successful strategies were copied. The 
mechanism effectively eliminated any strategic advantage of individual finns, which would arise 
from different strategic actions. The competitive system thereby entered into a self correcting, 
negative spiral of variation reduction in strategic initiatives. Finns' individual strategies became 
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less and less bold as the payback on strategic advantage was only temporary. Major changes in 
the industries, such as the launching of new standard generations had to be introduced by 
collaborative efforts across the industry. The homogenous demand patterns for the networks 
imply that consumers perceive the characteristics of the mobile network operators to be 
fundamentally similar. The model of strategic mimicry that we detect in the UK mobile 
communications market is also present in the Gennan market (Nattennann, 1999). Isomorphic 
strategies or strategic herding has strong appeal because of its risk reduction properties, which 
ensures the survival of more finns in the industry. 
The moderation of strategic variation, as observed in the UK industry, partly reflects 
Kaufmann's 'order for free' concept in NK Boolean networks. When the simulation is switched 
on, such a network would quickly settle to relatively few simple states, rather than explore the 
millions and trillions of variety of states which are mathematically possible. Furthennore, the 
complex adaptive behavior of the UK mobile market has some similarity to Reynolds' boids 
simulation (1987). There are clear rules and limitation of interconnectivity, standardization and 
regulation. The boids in the simulation are given rules of distance, velocity and direction. In both 
situations, the systems show no sensitivity to initial conditions. First mover advantage has no 
bearing in the UK mobile communications industry. Both systems exhibit a herding or swarming 
effect, and both have no real leader. In fact leadership shows signs of periodic change. The last 
entrant can lead the flock, as in the case of Orange, and the first entrant can lag behind. The 
emergent behavior of market leadership continues to fluctuation as long as the complex adaptive 
nature of the system is retained through its rules and the collective identity of its members. 
7. Conclusion 
Although the results provide compelling evidence, there is a need to expand this stream of 
research to encompass network usage and revenue indicators such as average revenue per user. 
Investigation into multiple levels of network and strategic effects may yield even more complex 
cycles of network externalities across interdependent platfonns. 
The empirical findings of this research shed light on complex adaptive behavior and 
isomorphic strategies in the mobile communications industry. The similarity of the organizations 
reduces their differentiation from the consumers' perspective and keeps market shares on the 
path of convergence. In contrast to other research on network industries (Arthur 1989, Redmond 
1991, Clark and Chatteljee 1999, Shy 2000) we take a dynamic view that incorporates the 
implications of interconnected and interdependent networks. This perspective raises a number of 
important issues regarding the emergence and development of interconnected networks. It 
complements Gottinger's (2003) econometric approach to understanding interconnectivity by 
introducing the dynamics of strategic mimicry and undifferentiated consumer adoption. 
The concept of strategic complicity sheds light on a chaos-reducing mechanism that 
eliminates the risk of failure of the majority of finns. Network externalities are exploited 
collectively and wimler-takes-all scenarios are eliminated. Complicity implies that the finns 
create a single interdependent network, bound together by adaptive mechanism of evolving 
technology and strategy. The research findings conceptualize the process dynamics of strategic 
development in network industries as a new integrative theoretical and practical phenomenon. 
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